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Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,
103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., I the
United States Supreme Court further defined the scope of the revital-
ized2 contract clause 3 by employing a three-pronged test4 to find that
state impairment of a private contract involving a regulated public util-
ity did not violate the Constitution.
In 1975, respondent Kansas Power & Light Company (KP&L), a
public utility, entered into two natural gas supply contracts with the
corporate predecessor of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. (ERG). Each
contract contained two price escalator clauses providing for increases in
the contract price to levels that any government authority might subse-
quently establish.'
In 1978, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act,6 which estab-
lished federal ceiling prices on natural gas and authorized states to set
prices as long as these prices did not exceed the federally established
ceilings. In response to the federal statute, the Kansas legislature en-
acted the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act,7 which prohibited
the consideration of federal price ceilings in the application of price
escalator clauses.
After a disagreement over price increases pursuant to the escalator
clauses, ERG filed suit in the Kansas courts to terminate its contracts
with KP&L.8 ERG argued that the Kansas statutory prohibition on the
use of the federal price ceiling in applying the contractual price escala-
1. 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
2. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 9.
4. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
5. Each contract contained two distinct indefinite price escalator clauses. The first, the gov-
ernmental price escalator clause, allowed contract prices to rise to whatever level any government
agency later established. The second, a price redetermination clause, gave Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. the option to negotiate a redetermination of the contract price no more than once
every two years. The last increase under this second clause had occurred in 1977. Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 701 (1983).
6. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
7. Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1401 to-1415 (Supp.
1982).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 703. The contracts provided that should Energy Reserves Group seek a
price increase pursuant to either escalator clause, Kansas Power & Light Co. must "seek from the
Kansas Corporation Commission approval to pass the increase through to consumers." Id. at 701.
If the Commission refused the pass-through request, and if Kansas Power & Light Co. chose not
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tor clauses violated the contract clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.9 The Supreme Court of Kansas unanimously upheld the trial
court's determination that the state statute did not violate the contract
clause.'" The United States Supreme Court affirmed t" and held that
the state's impairment of a private contract involving a regulated public
utility was not substantial enough to constitute a violation of the con-
tract clause.' 2
The contract clause attracted little attention or debate at the Consti-
tutional Convention in 1787.13 Many states considered the clause in
enacting liberal debtor relief laws soon after the Revolutionary War.
1 4
to pay the increase, then Energy Reserves Group could terminate the contract on 30 days written
notice. Id.
In late 1978, Energy Reserves Group notified Kansas Power & Light Co. that gas prices would
rise pursuant to the governmental price escalator clause. Id. at 703. After Kansas Power & Light
Co. failed to make timely application to the Commission for pass-through authority and refused
to pay the increase, Energy Reserves Group served notice of its intent to terminate the contracts.
Kansas Power & Light Co. replied that the Federal Act had not triggered the escalator clause and,
further, that the Kansas Act prohibited activation of the governmental price escalator clause. Id.
Energy Reserves Group filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had a right to terminate
the contracts. Energy Reserves Group also sought a new increase by invoking the price redetermi-
nation clause, which Kansas Power & Light Co. claimed the Kansas Act had nullified. Kansas
Power & Light Co. then counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the contracts were still in
effect. Id.
9. Id. at 704. The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o state shall. . . pass any. .. Law
impairing the obligation of contracts. ... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I.
10. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142
(1981). The state supreme court followed the trial court in employing a deferential means-end
analysis and concluded that the Kansas Act was "an appropriate exercise of the police power of
the state, that it was reasonable and fully justified under the circumstances, and that it is not
unconstitutional upon the basis of its retroactivity." Id. at 190, 630 P.2d at 1153.
11. 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
12. Id. at 709. Affirmation of the judgment was unanimous. Justice Blackmun authored the
Court's opinion, in which five other Justicesjoined. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment and that portion of the Court's opinion which
they felt disposed of the issue. See infra notes'40-54 and accompanying text. Although the case
also raised a question of the statutory construction of the Federal and State Acts, that issue lies
beyond the scope of this comment.
13. Madison's notes of the convention indicate that discussion or mention of the commerce
clause occurred on only three non-contentious occasions. See J. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478-79, 549, 567 (G. Hunt & J. Scott ed. 1920). Nor did the clause
arouse much debate during the ratification process. See B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE Or
THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1938).
14. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (10th ed. 1980);
B. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 4-13.
Although few believed that the clause possessed the potential for broader application, some
indications that its scope was not necessarily limited to debtor relief did exist. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison); B. WRIGHT, supra note 13 at 13.
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The Marshall Court expanded the reach of the clause in two ways.
First, the Court imposed a bar against the impairment of contracts in
general, whether or not the offending state legislation involved debtor
relief.' 5 Second, the Court extended the clause to include contracts to
which states were parties. 16
At the same time, the Marshall Court recognized limits on the reach
of the contract clause. The Court restricted application of the clause to
legislation that acted retrospectively. 7 The Court also acknowledged
the state's need to impair contractual obligations for the public good by
refusing to construe ambiguous terms of public contracts in favor of a
private party.'8
15. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). As early as Dartmouth College, however, the Court
recognized the right of a state to impair its own obligations under corporate charters that involved
&rants of political power or created civil institutions of government. See Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30.
16. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
17. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). This case contains Marshall's
sole constitutional dissent. Id. at 332-58 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Marshall argued for an
interpretation of the clause that would forbid state legislation whether it acted prospectively or
retrospectively. Id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). The majority of the Court, however, re-
jected Marshall's approach, resting their view in part on the conjunction of the contract clause
with prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Id. at 286 (juxtaposition of these
three provisions reveals framers' intent to prohibit legislation against already-existing rights). But
cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 90-92 (1980) (contract clause is distinct from bills of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws).
18. See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(II Pet.) 420, 544, 547-48 (1837); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 561-63 (1830).
In the nineteenth century, the Court articulated two other limiting principles of contract clause
jurisprudence that, while of importance as late as the 1940's, have played relatively minor roles in
the clause's more recent resurgence. First, the Court distinguished limitations on a remedy from
limitations on the substantive rights of the contracting parties and held that state laws involving
only the former were valid. See, e.g., Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 553
(1867) (states may change the form of the remedy as long as they do not impair any substantive
contractual rights); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819) (inherent distinc-
tion between substantive contractual obligation and statutory remedy to enforce that obligation
allows state to modify the latter at will). This approach resurfaced in the 1930's and 1940's, but
has played no role in contract clause analysis since. See generall, Note, Revival of the Contract
Clause- Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA.
L. REv. 377, 379-81 (1979). For a brief discussion of the artificial nature of the distinction be-
tween limitations on remedies and limitations on substantive rights, see G. GUNTHER, supra note
14, at 556.
Second, the Court initially held that the enlargement of contractual obligations lies beyond the
scope of the contract clause. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 412-13 (1829)
(creation of a contract is different from the destruction or impairment of a contract). By the
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Acting within the limits established during the Marshall era, the
Supreme Court employed the contract clause as the major restraint on
state economic regulation throughout most of the nineteenth century.1 9
By the end of the century, however, the contract clause declined in im-
portance as the Court primarily employed substantive due process as a
restraint on state economic regulation 20 and increasingly recognized
the states' police power as a restraint on the application of the contract
clause.2
The Court's deference toward state impairment of contractual obli-
gations under the police power grew during the first half of the twenti-
eth century. In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,22 the
Court held that a Minnesota statute granting relief from mortgage fore-
closures did not violate the contract clause. The Court employed a def-
erential means-end test similar to that adopted in substantive due
process cases that same year.23 The Court focused on five factors to
determine the legitimacy of the ends and the reasonableness of the
twentieth century, however, the Court had determined that the contract clause forbade the en-
largement of contractual obligations. See Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261
U.S. 236, 251 (1923) (increasing contractual obligations as much an impairment of those obliga-
tions as decreasing them). See generally Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. I),
57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 514-16 (1944). This continues to be the Court's position, although it has
not been the focus of recent analysis. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
244-45 n.16 (1978).
19. G. GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 554. See also B. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 95 (contract
clause the constitutional justification for striking down almost half of state laws so invalidated by
the Supreme Court).
20. Cf. B. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 95 (stating that in many cases involving the contract
clause plaintiff relied upon due process grounds as well).
21. The Court adopted two doctrines defining the police power. The first, a doctrine of "ina-
lienability," applies to public contracts and provides that "the legislature cannot bargain away the
police power of a State." Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880). The second, a doctrine of
"reserved power," applies to private contracts and provides that "the police power. . . is para-
mount to any rights under contracts between individuals." Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473,
480 (1905). See also Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J.
1623, 1626-27 (1980) (discussion of the two doctrines and their origins).
An additional reason for the clause's decline was the legislative reservation of power to amend
corporate charters either in the charters themselves or in incorporation statutes and state constitu-
tions. Although reservation clauses in charters and laws existed prior to early Marshall Court
decisions such as Dartmouth College, recourse by states to these clauses increased as the Court's
contract clause jurisprudence became clearer. B. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 58-60, 168-70,
22. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
23. "The question is . . . whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." Id. at 438. Cf. Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (leading case employing deferential means-ends analysis in context of
economic substantive due process).
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means: the existence of emergency economic conditions, the broad so-
cietal nature of the ends, the appropriate character of the means em-
ployed, the reasonableness of the conditions imposed, and the
temporary duration of the legislation.24
In City of El Paso v. Simmons,25 the Court adhered to the deferential
approach to state legislative acts developed in Blaisdell. However, the
Court referred to contractual obligations in terms of expectancy and
held that laws that restrict a party to gains reasonably expected from
the contract do not violate the contract clause even if such laws techni-
cally impair contractual obligations.26 The Court thus appeared to
render the contract clause a virtual nullity.27
In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,28 a state law failed for the
first time in almost forty years to withstand a challenge under the con-
tract clause29 when the Supreme Court invalidated a New Jersey stat-
ute repealing a prior covenant between the state and bondholders."0
The Court found that a statute could meet the constitutional require-
ment only if the means employed were reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose." When applying this standard,
however, the Court distinguished public from private contracts;32 in-
creased judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness and necessity of the leg-
islature's judgment was appropriate in those cases in which the state
was a party to the contract, for the state's own interests were involved.3 3
24. 290 U.S. at 444-47.
25. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
26. ld. at 515. This "reasonable expectations" approach differs considerably from Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's definition of a contractual obligation as "the law [that] binds [one]to perform his
undertaking." Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819).
27. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 258.
28. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
29. Prior to 1977, the Supreme Court last to struck down a state law under the contract clause
in Wood v. Lobett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941). Between Blaisdell and Wood, the Court decided eleven
contract clause cases and invalidated the state statutes in five of those cases. The Court generally
employed the deferential Blaisdell test and invalidated the state law when it failed to satisfy one of
the five factors identified in Blaisdell. In none of the cases did the Court overturn Blaidsell or
materially alter its test. For a brief discussion and a list of the cases, see Power, Populist Fiscal
Restraints and the Contract Clause, 65 Iowa 963, 966-67 & nn.38-39 (1980).
30. 431 U.S. at 32.
31. Id. at 25. The Court in United States Trust substituted the word "necessary" for the word
"appropriate" in its articulation of the Blaisdell means-ends test. For the distinction and the
difference it makes, see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 21-26.
33. Id. at 26. The Court defined "necessity" as the exhaustion of "less drastic" alternatives
by the legislature before it chose a means that impaired contractual obligations. Id. at 29-31. In
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The Court's dictum in United States Trust suggesting that it would
employ relaxed scrutiny in private contract cases implied a limit to the
revival of the contract clause.14 The following year, however, in 4llied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,3" the Supreme Court extended the
reach of the revived contract clause to private contracts, overturning a
Minnesota statute subjecting employers to a "pension funding charge"
if they closed their Minnesota offices or terminated their pension plans.
Noting that the contract clause did not function as an absolute ban on
impairments of contractual obligations, 3 6 the Court held that the
threshold inquiry in each case was whether the impairment was "sub-
stantial," based upon interference with the reasonable expectations of
the parties. 7 A finding of substantial impairment, the Court held,.trig-
gers strict judicial scrutiny of the "nature and purpose" of the state
legislation, 38 under a balancing-of-factors approach derived in large
part from Blaisdell.39
In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. ,40 the
Court created a tripartite test by which to measure state impairments of
contractual obligations, composed of elements of Allied Structural Steel
and United States Trust. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held
that the first step is to examine whether the state law in fact substan-
tially impairs the contractual relationship.4 If the impairment is sub-
stantial, Justice Blackmun continued, the strictness of the subsequent
contrast, in cases involving private contracts, the Court would grant great deference to the legisla-
ture's judgment of the reasonableness and necessity of the statute. Id. at 22-23.
34. Note, supra note 18, at 392.
35. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
36. Id. at 240. This flexible reading of the language is long-standing contract clause jurispru-
dence, dating back at least to the late nineteenth century cases that established police power limits
on the clause. See supra note 21.
37. 438 U.S. at 244.
38. Id. at 245.
39. Id. at 250. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. The Court noted that (i) the
state law focused on a narrow class of private employers rather than on a broad social or economic
problem, (ii) the state law operated in an area heretofore not subject to regulation, and (iii) the
state law worked a severe and permanent impairment on contractual relationships. Because of the
presence of these factors, the presumption of the reasonableness of the legislative choice failed,
and the Court invalidated the law. Id.
40. 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
41. Id. at 704-05 (citingAllied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978), If
the complainant failed to establish "substantial impairment", the Court implied that the inquiry
would be at an end. The Court articulated the threshold test using an "if. . . then" format: ' a
"substantial impairment" has occurred, then the Court will move to the second and third prongs
of the test. The clear implication is that failure to find a "substantial impairment" would obviate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss1/6
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scrutiny of the legislation will be directly proportional to the severity of
the impairment.42 Statutes which do not impair the parties' reasonable
contractual expectations, the Court suggested, do not constitute sub-
stantial impariment.43 Moreover, Justice Blackmun added, the Court
will consider past regulation of an industry in determining the extent of
the impairment.' Applying this analytical framework, Justice Black-
mun held that because a public utility with a past history of regulation
was a party to the contract, the Court presumed that the other party
entered the contract with the knowledge that subsequent price regula-
tion probably would occur.45 As a result, the Kansas law restricted the
parties to reasonably expected gains and could not, by the terms of the
test, constitute a substantial impairment.46
Although the statute in question failed to satisfy the threshold in-
quiry, the Court articulated two other elements of its test and applied
them to the facts of the case. If a substantial impairment has occurred,
Justice Blackmun stated, the Court must determine whether the state
has a "significant and legitimate public purpose" underlying the stat-
ute.47 The purpose of this ends scrutiny is to ensure that the state is
exercising its police power for the public good rather than providing
the need to continue the inquiry and result in a finding that the law did not violate the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 705 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1977); El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965)). See also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of El Paso and its changing definition of a contractual obligation and impairment).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 705. The Court draws not only on Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234, 242-43 n.13, but also on an earlier case. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.,
310 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1940) in which New Jersey regulation of the banking industry antedated the
contract by more than two decades.
45. 103 S. Ct. at 706-08. See also Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38
(1940) (purchase into a regulated enterprise subject to subsequent regulation by the state). Thus,
by first equating "substantial impairment" with the impairment of "reasonable expectations," and
then finding that the "reasonable expectations" of one who contracts with a regulated industry
includes subsequent price alterations, the Court has effectively insulated those industries with a
history of regulation from the reach of the contract clause, at least on issues of price.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 706-08.
47. Id. at 705 (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). The
public purpose need not involve a response to an emergency or temporary situation. E.g., United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 22 (1977); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940). But see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-47 (1934)
(emergency situation a major factor in determining that legislative end was a legitimate exercise of
the police power).
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benefits to a narrow group of special interests.48 In this case, the Court
found that the protection of consumers from the escalation in gas prices
after deregulation was a significant and legitimate purpose for which
the state could exercise its police power.4 9 At the same time, the Court
found that unlike the state law invalidated in Allied Structural Steel,5°
the aim of the legislation was not to benefit a narrow group of special
interests.
If the Court determines that the end is legitimate, Justice Blackmun
continued, the inquiry shifts to a consideration of the means employed
by the legislature." The statutory impairment must rest upon "reason-
able conditions" and be "appropriate" to the public purpose which jus-
tified adoption of the legislation." When the state is not a party to the
contract, he added, the Court will generally defer to the legislature's
judgment of the reasonableness of the means employed. 3 In this case,
the Court, deferring to the legislature's judgment, found that the means
employed by the Kansas legislature bore a rational relation to the pur-
pose of the statute. 4
At first glance, the Court appears not only to have brought a more
rational structure to its recent contract clause jurisprudence, but also to
have retreated toward the deferential stance to state legislation that it
48. 103 S. Ct. at 705. This provision obliquely recalls the framers' purpose of prohibiting
legislation beneficial to another limited class, debtors. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 708. The Court's scrutiny of the purpose of the legislation in this instance
was cursory at best. The Court noted that the Kansas legislature reasonably could have found
that higher gas prices were inimical to the public good, although there was no indication in the
opinion that the Kansas legislature had in fact made such a finding. The mere possibility that a
rational purpose underlay the statute appears to have been sufficient to meet this prong of the test.
Id. at 708. Such relaxed scrutiny is not necessarily inconsistent with the test which the court
developed in this case nor with such precedents as Allied Structural Steel. These cases call for a
sliding scale of scrutiny: when the impairment of contractual obligations is slight, the level of
scrutiny to which the Court subjects the legislation correspondingly decreases. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. Here, the legislation appears to include both the legislative purpose and
the means employed to achieve that purpose. Because the Court found that the impairment was
slight to non-existent, it adopted a deferential stance toward the scrutiny both of legislative means
and of legislative ends.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 708 n.25.
51. Id. at 705.
52. Id. (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). This element of
the EnergyReserves Group test substitutes the word "appropriate" for "necessity," which appeared
in United States Trust. The choice of "necessity" is indicative of the stricter means scrutiny re-
served in United States Trust for public contracts.
53. Id. at 705-06.
54. Id. at 709.
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had assumed prior to United States Trust." A closer reading suggests,
however, that the usefulness of the Court's test in future cases is limited
and that a final judgment on the direction of the Court must await later
decisions.
The test itself presents several problems. First, the Court's guidance
on what constitutes a substantial impairment outside the context of a
regulated industry is unnecessarily vague. Within the context of regu-
lated industries, the Court holds that future state price regulation is the
reasonable expectation of the parties; yet the key phrase "reasonable
expectation" receives no further elucidation that would give it explana-
tory force in other contexts.5 6 Nor does the source of this element of
the test, Allied Structural Steel, provide any guidance.57 Second, the
Court incorporates inconsistent approaches to the contact clause de-
rived from United States Trust and Allied Structural Steel. The first
part of the test, which comes fromAllied Structural Steel, compels strict
scrutiny of ends and means for severe impairments of contractual obli-
gations. 8 This requirement clashes directly with the third part of the
test, adopted from United States Trust59 , which requires deference to
legislative means.
Beyond the test's internal inconsistencies lies the questionable prece-
dential value of Energy Resources Group. As the concurring opinion
suggests, the Court had no need to go beyond the threshold inquiry to
dispose of the case.6 0 The last two elements of the test, therefore, are
dicta, and need not bind the Court in the future.
Another case decided later in the same term, Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton,6 t buttresses the foregoing analysis. Although Eagerton did
55. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 705. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The Court in.41lied Struc-
tural Steel did not articulate a test to determine when an impairment is of sufficient severity to
constitute a "substantial impairment." The Court instead reviewed the particular facts before it
and concluded that the statute nullified express terms of the contract. This destruction of contrac-
tual expectations lies at one extreme of the scale of severity of impairments and is, therefore, a
relatively easy case. What the Court failed to suggest is how to decide when a less drastic, but
nonetheless severe, impairment would qualify as substantial. 438 U.S. at 245-47.
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). When the appellant failed to show that the
Kansas law substantially impaired contractual obligations, inquiry into the ends and means pur-
sued by the state legislature became unnecessary. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
61. 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983).
Number 1]
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not overturn Energy Reserves Group, neither did it employ Energy
Reserves Group's tripartite test. 2 Consequently, all that the Court has
clearly indicated in Energy Reserves Group is that it will grant substan-
tial deference to state legislation affecting price provisions in contracts
that involve regulated industries in the face of challenges under the
contract clause. Beyond that narrow application, the importance of
Energy Reserve Group in the resurrection of the contract clause remains
doubtful.
R G. H
62. In Eagerton, the Court upheld an Alabama statute that prohibited oil and gas producers
from passing severance taxes on to customers and exempted royalty owners from the tax increase.
The challenge to the royalty exemption failed because the exemption simply did not impair any
contractual obligations. Id. at 2304-05. The Court found, on the other hand, that the pass-
through prohibition did restrict or nullify contractual obligations. Id. at 2305-07. Instead of em-
ploying the remaining elements of the Energy Reserves Group tripartite test, however, the Court
began by distinguishing statutes that "imposed a generally applicable rule of conduct designed to
advance a broad societal interest" from statutes that prescribed "a rule limited in effect to contrac-
tual obligations or remedies." Id. at 2306. Statutes that fell in the former category, such as the
Alabama pass-through provision, appear to be constitutional, while those in the latter category are
probably invalid. Generally applicable rules of conduct aimed at broad interests affect contrac-
tual obligations only indirectly, whereas narrower rules directly adjust the rights of the contracting
parties. Id. Thus the Court appears to be articulating an "effects" test, in which the constitution-
ality of the state statute depends upon the directness of the effect that the statute has on contrac-
tual obligations.
This case, furthermore, highlights the inconsistencies in the Energy Reserves Group test. The
Eagerton Court, although avoiding the use of the phrase "substantial impairment," found enough
of an impairment of contractual obligations to cross the threshold requirement of the Energy
Reserves Group test. Id. at 2305. One could consider the Court's focus on the broad societal aim
of the law to be an examination of the ends of the statute as required by the second prong of the
Energy Reserves Group test. At this point, however, the Court appeared to find the legitimacy of
the purpose sufficient to determine the constitutionality of the statute. There was no consideration
of the reasonableness and appropriateness of the statutory means in conjunction with the discus-
sion of the contract clause issue. Although the Court discussed means in its consideration of an
equal protection issue, it offered no more than a conclusory statement finding a rational relation
between means and ends in conformity with the lenient standard that the Court normally applies
to economic and commercial regulation under equal protection analysis. Id. at 2307-08. Use of a
rational relation test, however, conflicts with the heightened scrutiny of means and ends required
by the Energy Reserves Group test when there has been a finding of substantial impairment.
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